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Abstract 
In this article I analyse how the multinational oil company Shell has responded to the increasing 
institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) related to corporate environmental governance. 
The corporate culture in Shell appears favourable (Hoffman, 2001) towards the adoption of 
corporate environmental governance practices. The Shell top management is to this end appearing 
sincere in the way they monitor (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) the progress in giving secondary 
stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995) access to environmental information and to environmental decision-
making in Shell. Based on the Shell case I contribute in this article to descriptive stakeholder 
engagement theory by conceptualising a number of new internal influence strategies that engaged 
secondary stakeholders can use in their new face-to-face interactions with the corporations. These 
internal stakeholder influence strategies should be seen as adding to the list of external stakeholder 
influence strategies (e.g. Frooman, 1999) that secondary stakeholders can use in their traditional 
role of operating from the outside.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Within the field of the natural environment governments have traditionally imposed command and 
control regulation to ensure that corporations reduce their environmental impacts. However, in 
recent years the governments’ use of this form of green regulation has diminished (WRI, 2003) and 
a new type of regulation emphasising corporate self-governance has developed (Power, 1997). This 
new type of government regulation has through coercive pressures assisted in institutionalising 
(DiMaggio and Powel, 1983) corporate environmental governance processes in companies. In such 
processes secondary stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995), such as environmental NGOs, get access to 
corporate environmental information as well as access to internal corporate decision-making 
processes (WRI, 2003).  
The emerging regulation on environmental governance concerns both public 
authorities and corporations and can be dated back to the UN Rio Summit on Environment and 
Development in 1992. At this summit Heads of States from around the world agreed on some global 
policies and principles for how to pursue global sustainable development. A key principle to this 
end is principle 10 in the Rio Declaration (1992). This principle addresses the concept of 
environmental governance and recommends that governments ensure that concerned citizens get 
access to environmental information and access to environmental decision-making. Since Rio, the 
Aarhus Convention (1998) - an international environmental convention adopted by industrialised 
countries in 1998 – has turned this Rio principle on environmental governance into international 
law for developed countries. The convention outlines in detail governments’ obligations to give 
their citizens access to environmental information, including access to corporate environmental 
information, as well as to give their citizens access to environmental decision-making in public 
authorities. The citizens’ rights to access are in the convention defined by governments as human 
rights in the sense that citizens have a human right to know about and have influence on 
environmental factors that might be vital for their health. The Aarhus convention was originally an 
industrialised country convention. However, a growing number of developing countries have shown 
interest in this convention and have by now become parties to it (WRI, 2003). Furthermore, under 
the Aarhus convention a specific protocol (2003) on citizens’ rights to access to corporate 
environmental information was adopted in 2003. This protocol concerns the establishment of public 
accessible pollution registers. 
The Johannesburg UN environmental Summit in 2002 was held to evaluate how far 
the world was in terms of implementing the different Rio agreements. On the issue of 
environmental governance the summit continued the discussions under the Aarhus convention 
(1998) and confirmed that environmental transparency and environmental governance processes are 
gaining ground in public authorities and companies around the world. The same conclusion is 
drawn in the global mapping of environmental governance processes carried out in 2003 by World 
Resources Institute, UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank (WRI, 2003). While the Aarhus convention 
and the related protocol are not directly advancing citizens’ access to corporate environmental 
decision-making, but only their access to corporate environmental information, the Johannesburg 
summit was contributing to pave the way for citizens’ access also to corporate decision-making. 
The summit was to this end instrumental in setting up a large number of voluntary corporate 
environmental governance processes in companies around the world. The Johannesburg summit is 
thereby likely to have contributed to add mimetic institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powel, 
1983) to the growing coercive pressures that the primary governmental stakeholders (Clarkson, 
1995) put upon corporations to get them to be transparent and involve secondary stakeholders in 
corporate environmental decision-making. 
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The above described developments since Rio has contributed to a new development in 
stakeholder theory. A development where the traditional attention on stakeholder management (e.g. 
Mitchell et al, 1997) is shifting towards a new attention on stakeholder engagement (e.g. Post et al, 
2002). This article contributes to this development in stakeholder theory and produces based on a 
case study methodology new descriptive stakeholder engagement theory. The overall research 
question that will be addressed in this article is: How has the multinational oil company Shell 
responded to institutional pressures relating to corporate environmental governance and what 
does such corporate response imply for the conceptual understanding of the politics of secondary 
stakeholder influence. 
 
In investigating these questions I merge organisational decision-making theory (Cyert and March, 
1963; Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972) and stakeholder theory (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Frooman, 1999; Mitchell et al, 1997; Post et al, 2002). Based on the analysed Shell 
case the article argues that the diffusion of corporate environmental governance practices will 
change corporate environmental decision-making and add a new list of internal influence strategies 
to existing external influence strategies of secondary stakeholders. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the theoretical framework theories of organisational decision-making will be discussed. Based on 
this discussion the following analysis will look into how Shell has changed their corporate 
environmental decision-making in response to the growing institutional pressures relating to 
corporate environmental governance. The final discussion will address the new internal influence 
strategies of secondary stakeholder in corporate environmental governance processes. 
 
Corporate Environmental Governance  
Empirical observations of real life in corporations indicate that corporate decision-making processes 
are far from always unfolding as individual managerial rational decision-making. Thus, in 
describing corporate decision-making - as it develops in the practical reality - one needs to draw on 
a range of different decision-making models (March, 1994). Decision-making theory has to this end 
conceptualised four basic decision-making models: The rational model, the trial-and-error model, 
the coalition model and the garbage can model. While the rational model is characterised by the 
assumption that there is agreement on goals and methods for making the decision the other three 
models are characterised by less ideal assumptions about the social order in organizations. The trial-
and-error model assumes agreement about goals, but disagreement about methods. The coalition 
model assumes agreement about methods, but disagreement about goals. And lastly the garbage can 
model assumes disagreement about both goals and methods for making decisions in organizations 
(Thompson, 1967; Hatch, 1997).  
If corporations respond positively (Hoffman, 2001) to institutional pressures relating 
to corporate environmental governance processes they will start to engage secondary stakeholders 
such as environmental NGOs in their corporate environmental decision-making. In principle this 
should result in decisions that unfold as coalition decision-making (Cyert and March, 1963), where 
the secondary stakeholders are placed in a new role of being in face-to-face negotiations with the 
corporation.  
As indicated already in the above discussion the coalition decision-making model is a 
model of social processes of decision-making as opposed to both the rational and the trial-and-error 
decision-making models that are models of individual managerial decision-making (March, 1994). 
In the coalition decision-making model (Cyert and March, 1963) individuals with conflicting goals 
are viewed as forming coalitions to make decisions. The coalition members are in this decision-
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making producing a common goal through uniting their interest in ways that are collectively 
beneficial to themselves. According to the coalition model, the corporations that pursue coalition 
decision-making do that because they seek ways of making the social environment controllable. In 
coalition decision-making corporations’ negotiations with the social environment (which, in this 
case, is invited in house) is to this end not necessarily oriented towards the classical goal of profit 
maximisation. ‘Rather, it is an attempt to avoid uncertainty while obtaining a return that satisfies the 
profit and other demands of the coalition (Cyert and March, 1963, p. 168)’. The ‘other demands’ of 
the coalition is called side payments that is often related to some sort of policy commitment. In 
cases where corporations involve environmental NGOs in coalition decision-making processes the 
‘other demands’ of these secondary stakeholders are likely to be the corporation’s commitment to 
sustainable development. Through such side payments it should be possible for a coalition between 
the corporation and environmental NGOs to produce common goals and thereby make a coalition 
decision. Depending on how successful the secondary stakeholders are in their use of the new 
internal influence strategies available to them in corporate environmental governance a certain level 
of green side payments can be achieved. The final discussion will address the issue of internal 
influence strategies of secondary stakeholders engaged in corporate environmental governance 
unfolding as coalition decisions. 
It could be imagined that some corporations establish policies on corporate 
environmental governance for reasons of legitimacy, but is actually not implementing them. 
Another somewhat comparable situation could be that the corporation reluctantly engages 
environmental stakeholders according to corporate policies, while these stakeholders’ demands are 
not taken into consideration in the corporate decision-making. Both these options, however, seem to 
be problematic for the corporation. This is so since the secondary stakeholders that are to be 
engaged in corporate environmental governance processes can actually monitor for themselves if 
the corporation involves them and involves them in a meaningful way. Furthermore, these 
stakeholders are probably the same stakeholders that together with potential allies (Frooman, 1999; 
Rowley, 1997) can have a big say over the corporation’s green image and sustained legitimacy. 
Thus, different degrees of decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) in relation to corporate 
environmental governance appear to be an untenable strategy to sustain for the corporations.  
That decoupling is likely to be an untenable strategy in relation to corporate 
environmental governance might also become clear to the corporation for reasons other than those 
relating to legitimacy. This is so, because not least in those cases where corporate managers 
reluctantly engage secondary stakeholders according to corporate policies, but anyway seek to 
effectively exclude the secondary stakeholders from any influence over the decisions, the managers 
might end up with a decision situation characterised by unclear goals and also unclear methods. 
Such decision situations normally trigger the production of garbage can decisions (Cohen, March 
and Olsen, 1972). In the garbage can model independent streams of problems, solutions, 
participants, and choice opportunities flow into and through organisations. The model can be 
visualised by viewing the organisation as a garbage can and the flows of problems, solutions, 
participants, and choice opportunities as streams of wastes that get randomly mixed together in the 
organisational garbage can. Whenever problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities 
connect, a random decision is made. March and his colleagues (1972) found to this end that the 
order in the garbage can is related to that of time. There need not be any logical connection between 
problems and solutions that get attached to each other than that of their simultaneous presence in the 
organisational garbage can. In the final discussion I will discuss the new internal influence 
strategies of secondary stakeholders involved in corporate environmental governance unfolding as 
garbage can processes.  
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METHODS 
In this article I use a case study methodology in constructing new descriptive theory that contributes 
to the emerging field of stakeholder engagement theory (e.g. Post et al, 2002). A case study 
methodology is well suited to build theory in an area where little theory exists (Dutton and 
Dukerich, 1991).  
The first part of the case analysis focus on how Shell has responded favourably to 
institutional pressures relating to corporate environmental governance and to this end increasingly 
has engaged stakeholders in their environmental decision-making. The time period that will be 
analysed is the years between 1992 and 2002. This time period has been selected to trace the 
developments in Shell’s green decision-making following the Rio UN Environmental Summit in 
1992 and up until the Johannesburg UN Environmental Summit in 2002.  
As a first step in the Shell case analysis two qualitative interviews were carried out as 
1½-hour semi-structured interviews (Kvale, 2000). The overall theme in the interviews was the 
identification of the most influential factors in the greening of Shell since Rio. The interviews were 
carried out with the Manager for External Affairs in Dansk Shell as well as Shell’s Manager for 
External Affairs for the Scandinavian and Baltic area. The two External Affairs Managers were 
asked to talk both about their own geographic area as well as about the Shell Group as a whole. The 
two interviews identified stakeholder engagement in Shell’s corporate decision-making as a key 
driver in the greening of Shell. These two qualitative interviews have to this end been instrumental 
in defining the overall research question to be addressed in this article.  
The primary data for describing Shell’s stakeholder engagement in their 
environmental decision-making processes is coming from the following written sources: Shell’s 
external stakeholder communication (Annual Reports (AR) and Reports to Society (RS)) and Shell's 
internal stakeholder communication (ShellWorld (SW)). The text data has been read carefully and 
quotes identified within the two selected themes: sustainable development and secondary 
stakeholder engagement in corporate decision-making.  
In the article it is argued that analysing mediated written data will be able to capture 
key areas of intersubjectivity among organisational members (Czarniawska, 1997) vis-a-vis the 
development in Shell’s corporate decision-making. Some quite extensive studies of decision-
making processes (Witte, 1972; Snyder and Paige, 1958) confirms that mediated data as compared 
to data from individual interviews of organisational members are surprisingly good at capturing key 
areas of intersubjectivity relating to decision-making. This situation is not least the case when the 
analysis covers a long time period. Here the memory of individual interviewees may become a 
limitation in the analysis as compared to analysing mediated data written at the time where a new 
development in the corporate decision-making took place.  
 
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN SHELL 
In the following I analyse how Shell has responded to institutional pressures of engaging secondary 
stakeholders in their corporate environmental decision-making since Rio. The final discussion will 
address the implications of the diffusion of corporate environmental governance for the conceptual 
understanding of influence strategies of secondary stakeholders. 
 
Before Brent Spar 
By the time the Rio Summit took place in 1992 Shell was not willing to engage concerned citizens 
directly in their corporate decision-making. However, Shell appears in the data to follow quite 
closely the primary governmental stakeholders’ (Clarkson, 1995) Rio debate on this subject. 
Immediately before the Rio Summit, Shell Brazil to this end critically comments on the ongoing 
Rio debate on the engagement of concerned citizens. In an article entitled ‘A real involvement’, 
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Shell Brazil states: ‘Social responsibility is a pervasive underlying theme for Shell Brazil’s 
business…The company’s community activities derive from its legitimate interest in belonging to 
the society in which it operates. We believe that in the medium and long term we will prosper as a 
company if the community prospers, since we are part of it and depend on it for our own 
development (SW, Feb,1992:10).’ At that time ‘a real involvement’ to Shell only meant mutual 
growth for the benefit of both society and Shell. There is no sign in the data from the early ‘90s that 
Shell was in favour of the governments’ suggestions that concerned citizens should be engaged in 
corporate decision-making on sustainable development. Meanwhile, later in the ‘90s, Shell started 
to respond more favourably to the growing institutional pressures relating to corporate 
environmental governance. It was the Brent Spar episode in 1995, where Shell was forced to change 
their decision to dump an old oil storage platform at sea, that radically transformed Shell's response 
on pressures relating to corporate environmental governance. 
 
After Brent Spar 
The change in Shell’s response on the institutional pressures relating to environmental governance 
came as a result of coercive institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983) from the public in 
the Brent Spar event. The Brent Spar event happened in 1995 and at that time the Aarhus 
convention (1998) was not yet adding coercive institutional pressures from the governments 
through legislation. Thus, the pressures coming from the governments were in the mid 90’s mostly 
related to the non-binding Rio principle on environmental governance. To this end what happened 
in the Brent Spar event was that a primary stakeholder group (Clarkson, 1995) – the European 
consumers – entered into an alliance and where successfully mobilised by a secondary stakeholder – 
Greenpeace. Drawing on Rowling (1997) and Frooman (1999) it can be argued that Shell in the 
Brent Spar event was influenced by their stakeholders in a both indirect and direct way. The 
secondary stakeholder Greenpeace (supported by some European politicians) indirectly influenced 
Shell through an ally among the primary stakeholders – the consumers – who influenced Shell in a 
direct strategy of withholding their money in a consumer boycott of Shell. This combined 
stakeholder influence strategy managed to force Shell to change its decision on dumping Brent Spar 
at sea. In this article it should also be argued that this influence strategy became at the same time a 
usage strategy (Frooman, 1999), where Shell felt following Brent Spar that they had to green 
themselves and change their corporate decision-making to regain and sustain over time the 
consumers commitment. Thus, the external stakeholder influence strategy on Brent Spar managed 
to change both the decision on Brent Spar and also change Shell’s response to the emerging 
institutional pressures related to corporate environmental governance. The interview with the 
External Affairs Manager in Dansk Shell describes these effects of the Brent Spar event in the 
following ways:  
 
'We were very sure that what we were doing about Brent Spar was the right thing to do, but that 
seemed not to matter and it did not matter, because we did not have the public acceptance of our 
operations. So from being alone and just operating within Shell with all those great people with 
all the skills we were forced to open up. And of course opening up when you are not sure what 
way you are going is a though one. But what has been very important as I see it is that we never 
open up saying again ‘we know the best’.  Now we are opening up saying that this is a process. 
We do not know all the answers but we have to test something, we have to try something, because 
our ambition is as we have been here for a hundred years we would like to be here the next 
hundred years. If we want to be here the next hundred years, we have to change along with 
changes in society. And I think that made a huge impact on our trustworthiness - that we skipped 
that ‘we know best’ attitude and we started to listen. And actually what we see is - we are not half 
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the way yet but - but what we see is that we in several conferences are sitting together with those 
NGOs who in 94/ 95 did not even want to go into our shops, did not want to be in a dialogue with 
us, did not what to have anything to do with us. And now some of them are actually taken in as 
consultants to help when we are doing new things and the rest we are in very close dialogue 
with'.  
 
As described in the above quote the Brent Spar episode forced Shell to open up and involve itself in 
stakeholder engagement processes. And, in fact, the Brent Spar Dialogue process - initiated in late 
1995 following the media storm on Shell - became Shell’s first experiment on how to carry out 
corporate environmental governance processes. ‘In the past we decided matters largely internally 
and with regulatory bodies and then told the public. Brent Spar was a chastening experience and 
the big difference is that now we listen first and then decide (SW, April, 1997:25).' The Brent 
Spar dialogue process engaged a broad number of stakeholders in a face-to-face coalition decision-
making process on how to dispose Brent Spar. The green side payment to involved environmental 
NGOs was of a considerable size in the sense that Shell changed its decision completely and 
decided to on-shore the Brent Spar platform. The platform is today part of a quay in a harbour in 
Norway, which was considered the best environmental form of disposal by the engaged NGOs. 
Thus, the decision that was produced in the Brent Spar dialogue process was ending up not 
reflecting Shell’s original concerns over corporate economy, which in the first round had lead them 
to decide to off-shore dispose Brent Spar.  However, the new green decision, of cause, relates to 
corporate economy in the sense that Shell used the coalition decision on Brent Spar as a way of 
starting to make their social environment more controllable again (Cyert and March, 1963).  
 
 
Corporate Environmental Governance on the Project Level 
As will be reflected in the following, Shell has since Brent Spar put a lot of effort into develop, 
refine and further implement corporate environmental governance practices in their daily world-
wide decision-making on sustainable development issues. From the late ‘90s and onwards Shell’s 
Sustainable Development Management Framework ensures that a broad range of stakeholders, 
including environmental NGOs, are systematically involved in the Shell group’s environmental 
decision making on the project level.  
SustainAbility, an environmental NGO, was asked by Shell in 1999 to evaluate how 
far Shell had come and how far Shell still had to go on stakeholder engagement. They concluded: 
‘Stakeholder engagement is now a central plank in the company’s Sustainable Development 
Management Framework. Skills across the Group in this area are mixed and the challenge 
remains for the company to balance the drive for trust-based stakeholder relations with a need to 
show leadership and positive proposals for stakeholders to assess and help define. We have been 
impressed by the commitment of Shell Chemicals to push ahead with meaningful stakeholder 
engagement, particularly at a time when it has decided to divest 40 per cent of its business 
(SW,Oct,1999:10)'. By the late ‘90s Shell appears to be committed to corporate environmental 
governance - even in rough times. As reflected in the above quote Shell is across the entire Shell 
group seeking to find ways of giving stakeholders such as environmental NGOs access to Shell’s 
environmental information and decision-making on projects. The Shell management appears to this 
end to be very closely monitoring the progress on stakeholder engagement.  ShellWorld reports 
‘The Shell Group is considered by observers to be a leader in corporate responsibility (p. 13)…In 
the revised version of the Statement published in March 1997, an explicit responsibility for 
fundamental human rights was included for the first time, making Shell the first multinational 
company in the world to accept responsibility for its full impact on society (p.14)…A lot of large 
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organisations set out similar principles and codes of conduct but not all have the same means of 
implementation that Shell does (SW,Nov, 2001:14 ).’ The strict implementation mechanisms are 
described in great detail in the data from the late ‘90s and onwards. ‘A Sustainable Development 
Council exists to steer the implementation of the SDMF (Sustainable Development Management 
Framework) across the Group. The council, chaired by Mark Moody-Stuart (Chairman of 
Managing Directors), comprises senior executives from each of our five core businesses and the 
heads of the corporate centre directorates. The council is accountable to the Committee of 
Managing Directors (RS, 1999:36).’ Each country chairman of each operating company in the 
Shell group has to annually report personally in writing to the Committee of Managing Directors on 
the progress on the Sustainable Development Management Framework and its central plank of 
stakeholder engagement. This procedure has facilitated detailed statistics on the reported progress 
on stakeholder engagement in different parts of Shell: ‘Engagement, as an integral part of 
business decisions, remains an area to improve upon across the Group', the 1999 Shell Report to 
Society admits and continues: 'In 91 countries Shell companies have processes in place to engage 
with its communities on issues of local concern. In 67 countries Shell companies produce reports 
for external audiences. In 48 countries Shell companies measure the effectiveness of their 
engagement/communication procedures (RS,1999:19).’ The 2000 Shell report to Society follows 
up on this detailed evaluation and monitoring of Shell's performance on corporate environmental 
governance. The report explains: 'Engagement is an essential component of SDMF and the prime 
difference between it and traditional management frameworks. We have taken big strides in 
engaging more fully with a broader group of stakeholders…The use of engagement is slowly 
becoming a routine part of the way Shell companies do business…There is still much progress to 
be made but the signs are encouraging (RS,2000:33)'. The 2000 Shell report thereafter provides 
the following statistics on corporate environmental governance in operating companies throughout 
the global Shell Group:  
 
Table 1. 
 
Engagement      % of countries 
 Operating a procedure 
to systematically 
identify and engage key 
stakeholders 
Measuring the 
effectiveness of 
engagement 
Operating a procedure 
to use the results of 
stakeholder 
engagement 
Exploration & 
Production 
85% 45% 38% 
Oil Products 77% 42% 36% 
Downstream Gas and 
Power 
78% 43% 26% 
Chemicals 73% 35% 29% 
Renewables 94% 50% 44% 
 
 
Thus, it appears that Shell top management closely monitors the progress on stakeholder 
engagement throughout the Group in relation to Shell's Sustainable Development Management 
Framework. An activity that also allows Shell to monitor, refine and further develop its corporate 
environmental governance processes. What is indicated by table 1 above is that most operating 
companies have procedures for systematically engaging with key stakeholders. Around a third of 
the Shell operating companies have procedures for using the results of this involvement. The last 
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column is where the stakeholder engagement process effectively starts to merge with corporate 
decision-making. Thus, this is where Shell effectively can be said to practice corporate 
environmental governance.  
Summing up, Shell top management appears to be very ambitious and committed in 
their efforts of getting the company to pursue corporate environmental governance on the project 
level. Shell top management policies and monitoring of corporate environmental governance are to 
seriously strive for getting secondary stakeholders, such as environmental NGOs, actual access to 
Shell’s environmental information and green corporate decision-making on the project level. This 
apparent Shell top management commitment was also confirmed in the interview with Shell’s 
Manager for External Affairs for the Scandinavian and Baltic area. He emphasised that Shell 
believes it is in Shell’s own best interest to actively engage a very broad range of stakeholders, 
including NGOs, community groups, concerned neighbours to Shell facilities etc. That the full 
implementation of corporate environmental governance processes is not achieved yet in all 
operating companies in Shell is openly discussed many places in the data, but the goal is clear: all 
Shell’s green project decisions should move to the last column in table 1 above.  
 
Corporate Environmental Governance on the Strategic Level 
As described by Hoffman (2001) contemporary institutional theory seeks to emphasise the 
importance of the cultural specifics of the corporations involved in institutional isomorphic change. 
Depending on the corporate culture different corporations might react differently to the same 
institutional pressures. In case of Shell, it could be argued to this end that the Shell culture may be 
more favourable towards stakeholder engagement in corporate decision-making than would be the 
case in many other companies. This cultural readiness is probably not just a result of the Brent Spar 
event. It might also be traced back to Shell’s cultural roots. Shell is both a Dutch and British 
company and has long traditions for balancing these two cultural heritages in the company’s 
corporate decision-making.  
While Shell can be seen as very responsive to institutional pressures on corporate 
environmental governance it should be noted that Shell’s Sustainable Development Management 
Framework concerns only decisions on the project level. Shell has to this end defined decisions on 
the strategic level as decisions that should not be made through engaging external stakeholders such 
as green NGOs. In the data from the early and mid 90’s Shell is very silent on the issue of greening 
their investment decisions. The establishment of Shell International Renewables in 1997 changed 
this situation. This development in Shell produced a more open discussion on the greening of 
Shell’s investments decisions. This discussion in Shell is according to the data from the late 90’s 
and early 2000 driven forward not least by Jeroen van der Veer, who was Shell’s first Managing 
Director for  Renewables. To this end Jeroen van der Veer is in a noteworthy interview in 
ShellWorld in 1999 suggesting and explaining why he believes that secondary stakeholders, such as 
NGOs, should be engaged in Shell's corporate decision-making on the strategic level. Jeroen van 
der Veer explains 'Whereas in maintaining our licence to operate we ourselves decided what 
products and services we would offer, we now face a situation where society starts saying, “we 
like your gasoline more because you are also in solar energy”…Acknowledging society’s ability – 
and growing willingness – to influence the shape of Shell’s portfolio will have ramifications for 
the way decisions are made and implemented across the Group (p.26)’. Jeroen van der Veer 
continues arguing that getting ‘a licence to grow’ requires that Shell ‘must actively seek input from 
stakeholders, particularly NGOs, who might want to place a question mark, over an investment 
plan, for example (SW,April,1999:27).'.  
Summing up, as it appears Shell Renewables wants Shell's decisions on investments to 
be included in Shell's new corporate environmental governance processes. However, the cultural 
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readiness for engaging green NGOs in Shell’s strategic decisions appears, according to the data, not 
to be broadly present in Shell in the time period analysed in this article (1992-2002). However, it 
should be noted that Jeroen van der Veer, in fact, in 2004 became Shell’s new Chairman of 
Managing Directors. The future will show whether this development will add momentum to the 
development of Shell’s corporate environmental governance practices on the strategic level. If so it 
would be a quite exceptional corporate development. However, if such a development is not 
happening Shell’s early and ambitious stakeholder engagement on the project level will anyway 
have the implication that other companies are not just facing the increasing coercive institutional 
pressures coming from legislation. Mimetic (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) institutional pressures 
coming from Shell and other successful front runners on stakeholder engagement might also 
increasingly contribute to the diffusion of corporate environmental governance practices among 
companies.  
 
FINAL DISCUSSION 
In the Shell Report to Society for 2000, Mark Moody-Stuart, Chairman of Managing Directors, 
introduces the report by asking the question: ‘What is our progress in changing the way we make 
decisions? (RS,2000:2).’ The answer to this question is, as reflected above, that Shell has 
responded favourably to the institutional pressures relating to corporate environmental governance. 
Primary governmental stakeholders want corporations to give secondary stakeholders such as 
environmental NGOs access to environmental information and access to environmental corporate 
decision-making. Shell appears to be sincere in its efforts to live up to these new governmental 
demands. Thus, Shell has since Rio effectively changed its environmental decision making through 
systematically engaging secondary stakeholders in face-to-face green decision-making on the 
project level.  
 
Politics of Stakeholder Influence in Corporate Environmental Governance 
Mark Moody-Stuart’s question implies another key question to be addressed in the final discussion 
in this article: What are the implications of the diffusion of corporate environmental governance 
practices for the conceptual understanding of the politics of stakeholder influence. 
Based on the Shell case analysis it should be argued in this article that the diffusion of 
corporate environmental governance implies a new conceptual understanding of the politics of 
stakeholder influence. In this new conceptualisation, secondary external stakeholders, such as 
NGOs and community groups, play a double role. They become part of the internal face-to-face 
process of corporate decision-making and can thereby influence the corporation from the inside. 
They are, however, also still potentially playing their old role of influencing the corporation from 
the outside through corporate image. Thus, the diffusion of corporate environmental governance is 
not replacing existing conceptualisations of external stakeholder influence strategies (e.g. Frooman, 
1999). Instead it is adding some new internal secondary stakeholder strategies to the repertoire.  
In addressing these new internal influence policies it should be argued, as discussed 
above, that corporate environmental governance processes is likely to drag corporate environmental 
decision-making in a direction where goals and sometimes also methods become unclear. In these 
decision situations corporate decision-making will tend to unfold as coalition (Cyert and March, 
1963) or garbage can decision-making (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972). In both coalition and 
garbage can decision-making goals are unclear until the decision is produced (Thompson, 1967). 
Thus, goals are products and not precursors for the decision-making in corporate environmental 
governance. This implies that the precise content of the produced green goals cannot be fully 
predicted before the corporate environmental governance process has come to an end and the 
decision is made (March, 1994). The level of the achieved greening depends not least on the 
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following two things. First of all, it depends on how favourable the corporation’s culture (Hoffman, 
2001) is to the actual adoption of the corporate environmental governance practices. As discussed 
above Shell might belong to the group of companies that has a very favourable culture in relation to 
the primary governmental stakeholders’ increasing coercive pressures in relation to corporate 
environmental governance processes. In such corporations it might be easier to achieve green 
outcomes of these processes than in companies with more sceptical cultures. The level of greening 
achieved in corporate environmental governance also depends, as already mentioned in the 
theoretical framework, on how well the involved green NGOs and community groups understand 
and use their new internal stakeholder influence strategies. Below I will first discuss these new 
influence strategies and then before finalising this article address the corporate factor. 
 
Influence Strategies in Coalition and Garbage Can Decision-making 
The new internal influence strategies available to secondary stakeholders involved in corporate 
environmental governance are not entirely new. In fact, corporate decision-making theory has 
already for long been describing how to get influence on corporate decision-making that follow the 
coalition or the garbage can model. Thus, based on this knowledge I will below discuss a number of 
new internal influence strategies available for engaged secondary stakeholders. 
In coalition decision-making (Cyert and March, 1963) a goal and a decision is 
produced if the coalition that is formed is strong enough to win over other possible coalitions that 
might be interested in forming the goal and making the decision. March (1994) to this end explains 
how to form a coalition and influence coalition decision-making. ‘Forming a coalition in order to 
support a policy, whether in a legislature or in a board room, involves standard techniques of horse 
trading, persuasion, bribes, threats, and management of information. Those are the conventional 
procedures of discussion, politics, and policy formation. They are well conceived to help 
participants form coalitions, explore support for alternative policies, and develop a viable policy. 
Much of the genius of modern organizational leadership lies in skills at producing policy from the 
conflicting and inchoate ideas, demands, preconceptions, and prejudices of the groups to which 
organizational leadership must attend (p. 170).’  
Depending on the perceived salience (Mitchell et al, 1997) of the involved NGO’s and 
their possible allies (Frooman, 1999; Rowley, 1997) a particular winning coalition between the 
NGOs and a particular set of other coalition members can be formed. In influencing the coalition 
formation and the level of green side payments that can be produced in the coalition decision the 
involved environmental NGOs are likely to use, in particular, two new internal influence strategies. 
Both these strategies are related to making threats and are in that sense also related to the traditional 
external influence strategies for how NGOs operating from the outside through corporate image can 
have a say over corporate decision-making (Frooman, 1999). The first internal threat-based strategy 
concerns the secondary stakeholders’ face-to-face influence on the corporation’s dynamic 
perception of the secondary stakeholder’s power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al, 1997). The 
second internal threat-based strategy concerns the face-to-face influence on the corporation’s 
dynamic perception of the likelihood of the secondary stakeholder breaking out of the coalition to 
pursue traditional influence strategies directed at the corporate image.  
Having access to the face-to-face negotiations with the corporation is providing the 
secondary stakeholders with the above two new internal secondary stakeholder influence strategies. 
This face-to-face access to the corporate decision-making are furthermore likely to give the engaged 
secondary stakeholders valuable detailed inside information about conflicting demands of the other 
coalition members. Also, increasingly they are likely to get increased access to the behind the doors 
negotiations that is so characteristic for coalition decision-making. In total this new internal insight 
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and access provides the secondary stakeholders with even more new internal secondary stakeholder 
influence strategies. Strategies that are not necessarily threat-based.  
To this end engaged secondary stakeholders with the right detailed inside information 
and the right access to behind the door negotiations as well as with the right skills can use the above 
traditional coalition decision-making influence strategies directed at producing high levels of green 
side payments. Not least secondary stakeholders with skills for seeing opportunities to produce a 
greening out of the conflicting demands of the other coalition members will likely be those engaged 
stakeholders that are able to influence the decision-making.  
At the heart of all coalition decision-making influence strategies are three features that 
must be attended to, including by secondary stakeholders that wants to achieve final high levels of 
green side payments in coalition decisions. These three features concern the unstable nature of 
coalitions and the problems related to the implementation of coalition decisions. March (1994) lists 
the three features that makes coalitions unstable: 
 
‘1. Decision ambiguity. Ambiguity is frequently an advantage in the development of a coalition to 
support a decision…In assembling a coalition to support a policy, it is often necessary to make the 
terms of the agreement unclear in order to hide or suppress conflicts…When ambiguities are 
clarified in the course of implementation, the coalition tends to fall apart.  
 
2. Outcome optimism. Forming a winning coalition almost always leads coalition members to 
overestimate the positive consequences to be expected…great hopes lead to action, but great hopes 
are invitations to disappointments. This in turn leads both to an erosion of support and to an 
awareness of “failures of implementation”. As the policy is revealed to provide fewer payoffs to 
coalition members than they anticipated, the coalition tends to fall apart.  
 
3. Support exaggeration. Few major policies could be adopted without supporters for whom the 
policy is relatively unimportant except as a political bargain. They may be persuaded to join a 
coalition by claims of loyalty or friendship, or by a logroll in which their support is traded for 
support in other issues. In addition, a prominent feature of decision-making is that individuals and 
groups enter a decision arena for a variety of reasons, only some of which are concerned with the 
content of the decision. A typical coalition includes members who support the decision primarily so 
that they will be recorded as a supporter. For them, the decision has symbolic significance, but its 
implementation does not. As history moves from the adoption of a decision to its implementation, 
the coalition tends to fall apart (p. 171-2).’ 
 
Thus, an important aspect in influencing coalition decision-making concerns persistence and 
attention. To this end the final level of green side payments will depend on how good the secondary 
stakeholders are at sustaining attention to green issues in the coalition and how good they are at 
contributing to keeping a favourable green coalition together right until the decision is 
implemented. In this effort the secondary stakeholders will have to continually draw on the above 
discussed new internal secondary stakeholder influence strategies. 
The emphasis on attention and persistence is relevant not just in relation to secondary 
stakeholder influence trategies in coalition decision-making. Attention and persistence is also 
relevant if the corporate environmental governance process ends up unfolding as a garbage can 
decision. March (1995) has listed a number of traditional strategies that are typically used to 
influence garbage can decisions. A key strategy to this end is, according to March (1995), simply to 
use time on the process. Garbage can decisions are random and those that use a lot of time will 
eventually succeed in influencing the process. Another important and related influence strategy in 
 13
garbage can processes is to overload the system. In other words, those who contribute to 
substantially enlarge the steams of problems, solutions and choice opportunities are likely to get 
influence as opposed to those that are not adding much to these streams.  
The strategy of overloading the system is likely to be used automatically by engaged 
secondary stakeholders in corporate environmental governance. This is so since a broad group of 
potential green decision-makers (here secondary green stakeholders) has been activated in the 
corporate environmental governance process and this flow of potential green decision makers might 
- just as a consequence of having been involved - collectively produce a quite large flow of new 
green problems, solutions and decision occasions that potentially can enter the company’s 
organisational garbage can and there produce a random green decision.  
The strategy of using time is also likely to be used automatically by engaged 
secondary stakeholders in corporate environmental governance. The corporation that engages 
stakeholders is likely to get secondary stakeholders to spend a lot of time on them. This time use 
will according to March (1995) eventually produce influence on the corporation’s garbage can 
decisions.  
Summing up, depending on their salience, and their skills in using available internal 
influence strategies in coalition and garbage can decisions secondary stakeholders will succeed to a 
greater or a lesser extend in greening the corporate decisions. The remaining discussion will look 
into another important factor for the outcome of corporate environmental governance. This last 
discussion concerns the corporate factor. 
 
The Corporate Factor  
A favourable corporate culture in relation to corporate environmental governance is likely to 
increase the green effect of the above new internal secondary stakeholder influence strategies. This 
is not least so, since the favourable corporation will likely be more eager than sceptical ones to use 
for example proposals for how to integrate green aspects in conflicting demands in their corporate 
coalition decision-making.  
In the sceptical corporations different degrees of decoupling (Rowan and Meyer, 
1977) might occur. However, as argued in the theoretical framework decoupling in corporate 
environmental governance is not an easy strategy, because the supposedly engaged stakeholders can 
monitor their own engagement. Thus, the safest way ahead for corporations having reluctantly 
adopted corporate environmental governance practices appears to be pursuing coalition decisions 
where the green side payments to green NGOs are kept at the lowest possible level, while still 
sustaining these stakeholders in the coalition. This can be done by the sceptical corporation drawing 
on the traditional influence policies in coalition decision-making. The management of information 
might be one of the influence strategies that sceptical corporations will tend to use for that purpose. 
This is also likely why the primary governmental stakeholders are pressuring for increased 
environmental transparency in corporations. The best example on this pressure is the new protocol 
under the Aarhus convention that establishes public assessible pollution registers.  
The corporate strategy of keeping the secondary stakeholders in coalitions with low 
green side payments is having the potential of also safeguarding the decision against ending up as a 
green garbage can decision. As argued above, when corporate managers engage stakeholders in 
corporate decision-making and then try to pursue business-as-usual decision-making, they may end 
up producing a decision situation favourable towards the production of garbage can decisions. 
Secondary stakeholders with sufficient experience in corporate environmental governance processes 
and sufficient time to fully exploit the influence strategies in garbage can decision-making might be 
able to benefit from such a scenario. From the corporate perspective this scenario is not appearing 
as beneficial, since it makes corporate environmental decision-making rather unpredictable.  
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The Benefits of Corporate Environmental Governance 
In this last part of the final discussion I will based on the analysis of Shell point to some of the 
benefits that companies might discover are produced in corporate environmental governance when 
they start adopting these practices. When discovering these benefits some corporations might 
change their perhaps sceptical attitude towards corporate environmental governance. This last 
discussion is indicating that the corporate factor might be quite dynamic in relation to corporate 
environmental governance.  
In Shell it is according to the data Shell International Renewables that have the most 
positive attitude towards corporate environmental governance. However, the data reveals that there 
is a quite broad consensus in Shell that corporate environmental governance processes on the 
project level is an attractive option for Shell. Shell Exploration and Production (E&P) explains why: 
’We (E&P) are now thinking about a broader range of issues much earlier in the decision-
making process for new projects. This encourages people to solve potential social and 
environmental problems in innovative ways at the same time as they are considering the 
technical and financial aspects of investments decisions (RS,1999:21).’ Apparently, Shell’s 
corporate environmental governance processes on the project level works for Shell, including for 
Shell Exploration and Production. Of key importance here is the fact that it is Shell who determines 
the projects to be discussed in the governance processes. The discussion is not about whether 
projects should be carried out by Shell, but about what can be done to carry out these projects in the 
most environmentally and socially benign way. In that sense old values that sustain Shell as an oil 
company is protected. To carry out oil projects in an environmentally benign way does not 
necessarily accentuate Shell’s transition from being an oil company towards becoming an energy 
company also selling renewables. Thus, the scene is set by Shell for what types of decisions 
secondary stakeholders can influence. This set up appears according the data to be frustrating for 
Shell International Renewables and satisfactory for Shell Exploration and Production. 
Awaiting the outcome of this internal disagreement in Shell one can based on the 
above quote anyway start to identify some of the key benefits coming out of Shell’s corporate 
environmental governance processes on the project level. Three key benefits are touched upon in 
the quote. First of all, as reflected in the quote, corporate environmental governance can assist 
corporations in thinking about a broader range of issues in the decision-making process. In other 
words, involving secondary stakeholders can benefit the corporation through solving problems 
related to bounded rationality (Helper et al, 2000). Secondly, engaging green secondary 
stakeholders can assist in solving potential social and environmental problems in new innovative 
ways. In other words, corporate environmental governance can benefit the corporation by producing 
eco-innovations and new knowledge, which is an increasingly important intangible asset (Post et al, 
2002) in the contemporary knowledge society. Thirdly, environmental reputation, which is also an 
increasingly important intangible asset (Post et al, 2002), are ensured while green issues early on 
are integrated into business-as-usual instead of being dealt with in an expensive add on and repair 
strategy.  
To the above list of possible benefits potentially coming out of corporate 
environmental governance should also be added that engaging stakeholders might benefit the 
corporation through limiting opportunism in business-as-usual decision-making (Helper et al, 2000; 
Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005). Within the myth structure of rationalised societies (Power, 1997) 
there is a tendency to discuss the benefits of greening business in a way where business-as-usual is 
described as unfolding as a fully rational process of profit optimisation. Organisational decision-
making theory (Cyert and March, 1963; Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972) has for decades 
successfully documented that this is not the case. Interestingly, it might be, therefore, that green 
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stakeholder engagement is not just having the potential of producing the different benefits 
mentioned above, which are all related to the environment in some way. Perhaps one of the greatest 
benefits of engaging a broad range of green stakeholders in corporate decision-making might be that 
opportunism in business-as-usual decision-making is limited through what Helper et al (2000) 
characterise as processes of ‘learning by monitoring’. In other words, corporations can produce new 
knowledge and monitor opportunism in one and the same process. The monitoring of opportunism 
comes as a consequence of greater transparency in the processes in the sense that engaging 
stakeholders produces a situation of increased dialogue and information sharing. It is these 
knowledge and transparency related effects of stakeholder engagement that makes Helper et al 
(2000) as well as Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005) to suggest that learning by monitoring might also 
work on the strategic level. This argues in favour of Jeroen van der Veer’s proposal from 1999 that 
Shell's decisions on the investment level should be included in Shell's new corporate environmental 
governance processes. The future will show whether Jeroen van der Veer, Shell’s new Chairman of 
Managing Directors, is able and willing by now to operate as an institutional entrepreneur 
(DiMaggio,1988) and pursue his own proposal from 1999. 
Summing up, following Donaldson and Preston’s (1995) categorisation of stakeholder 
theories, the emergent field of stakeholder engagement theory is not just to be considered a 
normative theory. It is also by now to be considered a descriptive stakeholder theory. A theory that 
reflects the increasing diffusion of corporate environmental governance practices following the Rio 
summit. This is not to argue that traditional stakeholder management theory (e.g. Mitchell et al, 
1997) is not qualifying any longer as a descriptive stakeholder theory in Donaldson and Preston’s 
(1995) categorisations. However, it is to argue that corporations are not just managing the 
stakeholders that have a perceived high level of power, legitimacy and urgency. Corporations 
increasingly also seek to engage a quite broad array of less salient stakeholders in their corporate 
decision-making. This new engagement provides the secondary stakeholders with new internal 
influence strategies that they can use in their new face-to-face negotiations with the corporations. 
The new engagement provides the corporation with a number of benefits it has been argued. This 
discussion on benefits of engaging stakeholders relates to the instrumental category in Donaldson 
and Preston (1995). In this article I have added a new benefit in suggesting that corporate 
environmental governance might potentially be able to reduce opportunism in business-as-usual 
decision-making.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this article I analyse how the multinational oil company Shell has responded to the increasing 
institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) related to corporate environmental governance. 
The corporate culture in Shell appears favourable (Hoffman, 2001) towards the adoption of 
corporate environmental governance practices. The Shell top management is to this end appearing 
sincere in the way they monitor (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) the progress in giving secondary 
stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995) access to environmental information and to environmental decision-
making in Shell. Based on the Shell case I contribute in this article to descriptive stakeholder 
engagement theory by conceptualising a number of new internal influence strategies that engaged 
secondary stakeholders can use in their new face-to-face interactions with the corporations. These 
internal stakeholder influence strategies should be seen as adding to the list of external stakeholder 
influence strategies (e.g. Frooman, 1999) that secondary stakeholders can use in their traditional 
role of operating from the outside.  
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